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DEWEY’S EPISTEMOLOGY:
AN ARGUMENT FOR WARRANTED ASSERTIONS, KNOWING,
AND MEANINGFUL CLASSROOM PRACTICE
Deron R. Boyles
Georgia State University
In Discipleship or Pilgrimage?: The Educator’s Quest for Philosophy, Tony
Johnson criticizes philosophers of education for being, among other things, so infatuated
with professional philosophy that they lose sight of the connections between philosophy
and practical life. 1 The history Johnson outlines indicates that philosophy of education
was officially “born” at the hotel Traymore in Atlantic City, New Jersey on February 24,
1935 (the founding of The John Dewey Society) or in 1941 with the founding of the
Philosophy of Education Society (North American). 2 Regardless, Johnson’s point is that
in an effort to gain respectability as a learned society or guild, philosophers of education
gave up social relevancy for academic respectability. In an effort to navigate the
treacherous path between and among professionalism and social relevancy, this paper
takes up an area of professional philosophy—epistemology—with the intention of
reclaiming the integrative role John Dewey held for philosophy and classroom practice.
That is, I wish to revive a particular epistemological view in order to bridge the
professional field of epistemology with classroom practice.
As an area within professional philosophy, epistemology went through a variety
of transformations in the twentieth century. From traditional accounts of knowledge
favored by analytic philosophers to the relativists’ outright rejection of epistemology as a
valuable area of inquiry, epistemology was tossed around and sometimes tossed out of
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many investigations. Still, but not unproblematically, epistemology as a term continued
to be used in discourse concerning pure knowledge, practical knowledge, social
constructed knowledge, and the like. Aside from those professional philosophers who
took up the area of epistemology as a primary focus of study, 3 epistemology seemed to
both fall out of favor as a major area of focus for those interested in education and
schooling and fall into favor as a buzzword to add an aura of respectability to various
research articles and agendas.
The term “epistemology” has been widely sprinkled amid myriad articles, but as a
primary focus of work in the area of education, the field is rarely evidenced. As regards
Dewey and epistemology, there are limited examples from within the pages of this
journal. Jeanne Connell’s work comparing Dewey’s epistemology to Rosenblatt’s reader
response theory is one instance and she provides insight regarding the concept
transaction. 4 Joe R. Burnett explores Dewey’s later thinking and connects Dewey’s
theory of inquiry to a theory of aesthetic and religious experience. 5 Phillip Eddy
compares Dewey and Kolberg and identifies the role of formal structures in thought
connected to epistemology. 6 Differently, Barry Duff argues that by investigating “event”
in Dewey’s later thinking, we can better understand what he claims is a wide
misunderstanding of Dewey’s notion of “experience.” 7 Duff notes that “because Dewey
rejects ‘the ubiquity of all comprehensive cognitive experience’ and does not identify the
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real within the cognitive, the concept of knowledge does not have the importance in his
philosophy that it has in others.” 8 Still differently, and not explicitly epistemological,
Craig Cunningham investigates Dewey’s later conception of the self and explores
features of unique potential relating, ultimately, to character education in schools. 9
Perhaps closer to the point are Greg Seals’ efforts at explaining Dewey’s science
of teaching and Barbara Stengel’s work relating Dewey’s concept of “method of
intelligence” to schooling. 10 Seals proposes a frame of reference from which teaching
and learning are seen “as a field of scientific endeavor in its own right.” 11 Stengel, in
comparing and questioning various texts’ use of Dewey and what implications for teacher
practice might obtain from understanding a “method intelligence,” makes important
suggestions for teacher knowledge and practice. Still, like those noted earlier, taking up
the specific topic of Deweyan epistemology was not the primary focus of either essay.
This is not, of course, a criticism of any of the theorists or their work. The point is
simply to indicate that specific inquiry into Dewey’s epistemology, per se, is rare in the
pages of this journal. For philosophy of education, more broadly, I wonder whether the
occasional forays into epistemology failed to become a primary focus because
epistemology, generally, was (and is?) seen as suffering from a hypertrophied and
myopic focus on traditional accounts of “pure” knowledge.
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Historical Considerations for Connecting and Clarifying Deweyan Epistemology
The relatively recent history of epistemology included and was dominated by
Russell, Frege, Moore, and others committed to an analytic view of professional
philosophy. Language, correspondence theories, independent reality, and
foundationalism were major foci at the beginning of the twentieth century. James,
Dewey, and other pragmatists, however, launched an attack on the analytic approach in
the early 1900s and Dewey and Russell engaged in well-known debates about the nature
of knowledge and the various requirements for one to be said to know anything at all. 12
Just prior to Russell, however, were other critics like new realists and critical realists.
New realists William Montague and Ralph Barton Perry, who were students of the
idealist Josiah Royce, mounted an effort to promote a non-Roycean pluralism that
nonetheless held out hope for a doctrine of immediate perception and the independence
of objects in epistemological inquiry. J.B. Pratt and other critical realists rejected the
new realists’ doctrine of immediate perception because they did not believe that
perception was unmediated. They held, instead, that the mind is a mediating factory
between physical objects, perception, and meaning. 13
Dewey faced criticism from virtually all of these foregoing philosophers but
continually rejected attacks on his naturalistic empiricism. He set out to clarify what he
meant by truth, reality, and knowledge and was often writing in defense of his views.
While he accepted some of the new realist claims (e.g., reality is not dependent on human
consciousness), Dewey did not accept central points like the absolute independence of
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things from thoughts. 14 Instead, Dewey offered a theory that opposed both idealism and
the variants of realism: he argued that knowledge and experience are not coextensive.
Dewey also rejected defining perception (rank or base empiricism) as knowledge because
of the problem of immediacy. Knowledge cannot be had in an instant. It takes time and
is an achievement. Knowledge eventually comes; “it is the result of situated processes
that were initiated to respond to specific problems.” 15 Perception is not immediate either.
Perceiving takes time and involves habits. Perceiving, as Dewey pointed out in his paper
“The Reflect Arc Concept in Psychology,” means data are screened, chosen, and
refined. 16 Indeed, as Hildebrand points out, such activities as perceiving and knowing
“always occur within the context of larger ‘situations,’ a nexus of ongoing processes and
purposes.” 17
Dewey therefore rejected traditional accounts of epistemology. He did so, in part,
because he saw traditional epistemology as a hollow area of inquiry given the primacy of
the truth condition in the traditional syllogism (S knows that p iff: p, S believes that p, and
S justifies that p). He saw the disconnected nature of the theories philosophers were
putting forward. In separating out the contexts of perception and the knowing that
results, Dewey was frustrated by new realist, critical realist, and idealist efforts at
developing a theory of knowledge. I wonder whether his frustration is also felt in more
current times. Contemporary neo-pragmatists like Rorty and Putnam, like Dewey, reject
notions of correspondence and see correspondence theories of truth as being central to
questions of epistemology that the enterprise of epistemology itself is called into
14
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question. 18 One arguable result is that those interested in a pragmatic theory of
knowledge find themselves continually mounting their defense in terms of traditional
epistemology, contrasting though the terms may be. Another result seems to me to be a
dearth of inquiry that bridges the work of professional philosophers studying
epistemology with philosophers of education studying epistemology and linking it to
classroom practice.
One consequence, then, appears to be that in the process of rejecting various
major components of epistemology, the enterprise of inquiring into knowledge and
knowing has largely been discredited or disregarded—at least to the degree that those in
education are rarely if ever part of the larger conversation concerning epistemology (and
those within epistemology are rarely if ever part of the larger conversation concerning
education). 19 I wish to assert that epistemology can and should represent an area of
inquiry that is relevant and useful for philosophy of education, especially as it develops
classroom practices that foster inquiry. I specifically wish to revive Dewey’s conception
of warranted assertibility in an effort to show the value of fallibilist epistemology in
practical and social teaching and learning contexts. By highlighting the distinctions
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between traditional epistemology (via Russell, Frege, etc.) and Dewey’s conception of
knowing, epistemology will be shown to have value insofar as it highlights a more useful,
instrumentalist theory of knowing that is applicable to classroom practice.

Rejecting Traditional Epistemology: Developing a Theory of Inquiry
In The Quest for Certainty, Dewey argues for the overthrow of traditional
epistemology. 20 He specifically rejects the “Spectator Theory of Knowledge,” (STK) and
argues, as some have taken it, against epistemology writ large. 21 I disagree with the
conclusion that Dewey throws out epistemology as a whole. In setting STK aside,
Dewey sets much of traditional epistemology aside, but he clearly does not argue against
knowing or the known. He argues against the reliance on ontological and metaphysical
ideals entailed by traditional accounts of “pure knowledge.” In place of such a traditional
account, Dewey crafts a new version of epistemology—one that has as a key element the
notion of warranted assertibility. 22
Warrented assertions replace justification in the traditional syllogism while at the
same time imploding the syllogism itself. Where justification served a correspondence
theory of truth in the traditional account of knowledge, warranted assertions merge truth
and inquiry together in such a way that correspondence to an external world is no longer
the point. The point, instead, is the interdependency of truths and the processes of
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inquiry: the temporal satisfaction of solved problems in a world that is not set apart from
the knower’s use(s) of the world or place(s) in that world. In this way, idealists and
realists are misguided when they describe epistemology as way of determining
knowledge. 23 “Knowledge” is not the focal point of epistemology for Dewey:
“knowing” is. “Knowledge” represents the end of inquiry but, according to Dewey, it is
also often supposed to have a meaning of its own—disconnected from inquiry. The
result is that inquiry is subordinated to the fixed end called “knowledge.” 24 By
“knowing” Dewey means inquiry in a world that is not static. He means inquiry into
things “lived” by people. He means experimenting with solving problems such that the
action entailed in the solving of problems is inquiry itself and warranted in the assertions
made about the solved problem when it is solved (where “solved” is understood as
temporal and a portal to further inquiry). Accordingly, in the “living” of life, problems
will be faced and solved—often in serendipitous ways—such that achieving “justified
true belief” (as traditional epistemology expects) is not useful. As Dewey put it:
[Warranted assertion] is preferred to the terms belief and knowledge [because] it is
free from the ambiguity of these latter terms, and it involves reference to inquiry
as that which warrants assertion. When knowledge is taken as a general abstract
term related to inquiry in the abstract, it means “warranted assertibility.” The use
of a term that designates potentiality rather than an actuality involves recognition
that all special conclusions of special inquiries are parts of enterprise that is
continually renewed, or is a going concern. 25

23
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At least two things follow from warranted assertions: 1) knowing is not
sufficiently described as an abstract, semantic enterprise—rather it is an enterprise rooted
in problems faced by people in context (Dewey is arguing for knowers as people who can
defend their claims to knowledge [a form of epistemic responsibility]); and 2) that one
can know, but fallibilistically so rather than foundationally so. Knowledge claims can
exist for fallibilists like Dewey, in other words, but without commitment to universality
and without commitment to linguistic correspondence to extra-linguistic “fact.” This is
so because, according to Dewey, there is no use or meaning that is derived sans living.
Language is a tool to make sense of our experiences, but it derives its meaning and utility
from our lives.
Our lives should be guided, on Dewey’s view, by inquiry: “the controlled or
directed transformation of an indeterminate situation into one that is so determinate in its
constituent distinctions and relations as to convert the elements of the original situation
into a unified whole.” 26 Knowing comes about when inquiry leads to an understanding
that goes beyond mere apprehension. One might “understand,” i.e., “apprehend” the
ideas of moose, chemical elements, or musical notes, but knowing requires having a
sense of grounds (the “warrant”) for asserting their existence. 27 This is a key point to
which I will return later in discussing warranted assertions and classroom practice.
Before then, however, consider how traditional notions like “truth” and “proposition” in
the history of epistemology differ from elements within Dewey’s theory of inquiry.

Logic, Truth, and the Confusion over Propositions and Judgements

26
27
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Traditional epistemology arguably extends back at least to Plato, but the content
or structural elements of syllogisms concerning knowledge found, say, in Plato’s
Theaetetus, only provide a starting point for understanding the development (or lack
thereof) of traditional epistemology. I wish to stipulate that the zenith of traditional
epistemology is found in the analytic philosophy of Russell, Frege, the early
Wittgenstein, etc. With those philosophers, the point was to achieve correspondence
between uttered claims and extra-linguistic fact. The truth condition in the traditional
syllogism of epistemology, in other words, was the point. The belief and justification
conditions served the truth condition. Said differently, and more broadly, epistemology
served a correspondence theory of truth. This point is important because key terms used
most prominently by Russell distort Dewey’s epistemology. Specifically, as Burke notes,
Russell misapplied the term proposition when considering Dewey’s theory of logic and
his entailing theory of knowledge. 28 Russell could not divorce propositions from a
theory of truth, but Dewey’s logic and epistemology relied on judgements and their
warranted assertibility, not truth-focused propositions. As a result, Dewey rejected the
metaphysics undergirding Plato, Russell, and others, even if sometimes in confusing
ways.
For Russell, propositions were sentences. They were fodder for linguistic
analysis. Accordingly, Dewey’s notion of warranted assertibility—as Russell understood
it—was an inadequate account of truth and was considered by Russell to be irrelevant to
logic anyway. 29 The problem here is that warranted assertibility was not intended or

28

Burke, op. cit.
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claimed by Dewey to be an account of truth where truth is understood in terms of
traditional notions of correspondence. Where propositions are either confirmed or
refuted, judgements are, on Dewey’s view, said to be warrantably assertible or not.
Where Russell elevated truth to the level of STK, Dewey saw truth and warranted
assertions as connect, but not in the same way Russell did, or in the same way authors
like Kulp and John Shook suggest. 30
On Dewey’s view, as Burke points out, “it is judgments, not propositions, which
are warrantably assertible or not; and judgments are essentially rooted in concrete actions
in the world insofar as the consequences of such actions serve to decide their
warrantability.” 31 This does not provide us with a theory of truth, but Dewey did not
claim warranted assertibility as a theory of truth. Dewey argued, instead, that warranted
assertibility (rather than truth) should be a primary consideration in a theory of inference.
What is true and what is false are conclusions, not the necessary factors of inquiry. In
Knowing and the Known, Dewey and Bentley put it this way:
It is frequently said that no matter what form of inquiry one undertakes into life
and mind one involves himself always in metaphysics and can never escape it. In
contrast with this hoary adage, our position is that if one seeks with enough
earnestness to identify his attitude of workmanship and the directions of his
orientation, he can by-pass the metaphysics by the simple act of keeping
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observation and postulation hand-in-hand; the varied “ultimates” of metaphysics
become chips that lie where they fall. 32
As Burke notes, “The truth or falsity of a given judgment is characterized in terms of
relations and correspondence among expectation and actual result of actions formulated
in the course of the respective inquiry, but, strictly speaking, it is the assertion of the
judgment which is true or not, not the information involved in ascertaining the
judgment….” 33 To say all of this somewhat differently, the warranted assertibility of
your judgment is “tangibly certifiable” through your concrete actions in the world.
Educative experiences provide the opportunity for solving problems via warranted
assertions. The truth of your assertion is basically a metaphysical ideal. Writes Dewey:
Judgment may be identified as the settled outcome of inquiry. It is concerned
with the concluding objects that emerge from inquiry in their status of being
conclusive. Judgment in this sense is distinguished from propositions. The
content of the latter is intermediate and representative and is carried by symbols;
while judgment, as finally made, has direct existential import. The terms
affirmation and assertion are employed in current speech interchangeably. But
there is a difference…between the logical status of intermediate subject-matters
that are taken for use in connection with what they lead to as means, and subject
matter which has be prepared to final. I shall use assertion to designate the latter
logical status and affirmation to name the former….However, the important

32
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matter is not the words, but the logical properties characteristic of different
subject-matters. 34
Warranted assertibility, for Dewey, was part of a project to explain (1) what it means to
say that a statement about how things are may or may not correspond to how things
actually are, when at the same time, (2) it is not possible to step back and treat this
correspondence as if it were a matter of comparing the statement against bare reality.35
Burke puts it this way: “It is not as if we have some statement-independent handle on
bare reality so that we can hold it up to compare against our statements, since it is the
statements themselves and the processes that go into their making which are one’s handle
on bare reality.” 36 What we have to do is make judgments in “real time” about
consequences of actions in solving actual problems. Correspondence, then, becomes a
metaphor for Dewey, allowing him to point out that while a “spectator” version of
detachment is not completely wrong, neither does it describe nor explain how people
actually use information from their lives to solves problems that they face. The relevance
of the “spectator” is in the very detachment Dewey eschews. “Spectators” don’t assert,
they passively observe. “Spectators” are outside of experience—at least the kind of
experience that is engaging of others.
For Dewey, the speculative enterprise of traditional epistemology suffered greatly
at the hands of “correspondence” theories because, as he wrote in 1941, “wondering at
how something in experience could be asserted to correspond to something by definition
outside of experience [STK]…is what made me suspicious of the whole epistemological
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industry.” 37 Dewey, therefore, rejected STK and its detachments (the very thing that
traditional accounts of correspondence endorse, e.g., Russell, Kulp, etc.) in order that we
would have individual “knowers” “concretely and dynamically embedded in the
world.” 38 As a result, those “knowers” would have access to (mediated) knowledge,
where knowledge is not understood in semantically detached terms. Semantic
detachment is indicative of the very correspondence Dewey eschews. While it may
appear that some of Dewey’s views commit him to a form of idealism, the fact that
Dewey concentrates so much attention on concrete situatedness means that no such
entailment need obtain. He is, instead, an operationalist. He values inquiry that
demonstrates a connection between expected consequences and actual consequences.

Knowing, Knowledge, and Intelligence: Epistemology Goes to School
Here it may be helpful to distinguish between a few key concepts in order to
better understand the import of warranted assertibility and its relationship to classroom
interaction. Knowing, knowledge, and intelligence are distinct for Dewey. Knowing is
an inquiry (specific instances of applying oneself to solving problems), knowledge
constitutes the stable outcomes of inquiry, and intelligence is the result of the
development and accumulation of capabilities to act (i.e., inquire) in specific ways. That
is, intelligent action is action constructed in the light of properly anticipated
consequences. “Knowledge is the result of successful inquiry, whereas knowing consists
in using one’s intelligence in given inquiries. Intelligence is stabilized
knowledge…which can be utilized in other inquiries, given the principle of continuity

37
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Burke, 243.
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and given the fact that judgments are not merely abstract decisions but constitute a kind
of conduct (assertion)….Knowing is to intelligence roughly what asserting is to being
disposed to assert.” 39 Says Dewey:
...from the standpoint of empirical naturalism, the denotative reference of “mind”
and “intelligence” is to funding of meanings and significances, a funding which is
both a product of past inquiries or knowings and the means of enriching and
controlling the subject-matters of subsequent experiences. The function of
enrichment and control is exercised by incorporation of what was gained in past
experience in attitudes and habits which, in their interaction with the environment,
create the clearer, better ordered, “fuller” or richer materials of later experience—
a process capable of indefinite continuance. 40
What we have in this quite is Dewey’s basic argument for classroom interaction. Organic
and natural environments for learning impel knowing and the habits of intelligence.
Detachment from natural environments for learning foster “spectating” and habits of
routine. When one supports a quest a for “meanings and significances,” one sides with
inquiry via warranted assertions. That is, given Dewey’s epistemology, classrooms
should be places where students make knowledge claims at the very same time they are
engaged in knowing (inquiry), since the means and ends are not separable for Dewey, and
since the point of inquiry is not to college detached artifacts or pieces of the dead wood
of the past. Active engagement of the sort Dewey suggests 41 means students attempt
stability rather than certainty. They are not in the business of “discovering” the basic

39
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beliefs on which traditional epistemology qua foundationalism relies. Rather, stability
indicates functionality over universality.
Still, stability is not assured by Dewey either. In fact, much of the point of
interacting “with the environment” is “creat[ing] the clearer, better ordered, ‘fuller’ or
richer materials of later experience—a process capable of in indefinite continuance.” 42
[I]ntelligence is more than just a store of habits and context-sensitive dispositions.
Intelligence is habitual, but not all habit is intelligent. Experience guided by
intelligent habit, rather than merely routine habit, is experience characterized by
resourcefulness, inventiveness, ingenuity, tenacity, efficiency, and any such
“pragmatic virtue” designed to anticipate not only the regularities and constancies
of experience but also the inevitable uncertainties and indeterminacies.” 43
Epistemological fallibilists hold that knowledge claims can be valid, even if the veracity
of the knowledge claim is not universal. Dewey, as a fallibilist, hones in on stability and
the never-ending search for meaning as a way to indicate the limits of foundationalism
(via correspondence theories of truth) and he replaces correspondence and
foundationalism with the warrantability of assertions and fallibilism.
Ultimately, then, how valuable might warranted assertibility be for classroom
interaction? What would go on in classrooms that would be different from what currently
goes on in most school spheres? What might it look like? One way to address these
questions is to envision new roles for teachers and students. Following the notion of
warranted assertibility, both teachers and students would become fallible knowers who
must defend their claims to knowledge, where knowledge represents a temporal
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suspension point in the process of making judgments (Dewey’s theory of inquiry and his
theory of logic). In so doing, both teachers and students realize the limitations of
universal, foundational, “comfort zones,” and demonstrate the kind of continual thinking
and re-thinking required of those who face change in their lives and who, as a result of
said change, must continually defend their claims to knowledge. The “moose,”
“chemical elements,” and “musical notes” examples from the beginning of this essay
illustrate that identifying the ideas only represents narrative and the “comfort zones” of
traditional epistemology (and traditional curriculum and schooling). Even if “correctly
identified,” the point of warranted assertibility is to determine meaning and connection
with other ideas that are or represent real problems to solve. In what possible ways might
moose and musical notes connect? What links are there to chemical elements and what
do any and all of the particulars actually mean? What contexts are required for
understanding and what problems are within those contexts that would provide students
opportunities for inquiry (proving that moose, music, and chemistry are of interest in the
first place)?
In characterizing the problem Dewey had with “intellectualists” and professional
philosophers, Hildebrand notes the following: “Sidetracked from the problematic and
lived situation that instigated inquiry in the first place, philosophers institutionalize their
practice…into an ontology with eternal permanence.” 44 Teachers are rarely different
from this characterization. They, too, institutionalize their practice, even if
hegemonically so. This point raises at least two issues: A) the superstructure and
metanarrative of schooling; and B) the specific responsibility of teachers in a given
situation.
44

Hidebrand, 64,
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For the first point, one could argue that schools are structured to support a version
of traditional epistemology. If schools are not truly foundationalist, insofar as they
expect students to amass “pure” knowledge via STK, then they are reliabilist insofar as
they require only correct answers without justification. While much more time could be
spent on distinguishing the variations of epistemology within schools, one point seems
clear: it is rare that teacher provide emergent contexts for the development of inquiry and
knowing in the Deweyan sense. In terms of the superstructure of schools, this only
makes sense. Order, discipline, and time-on-task expectations do not support inquiry that
is varied, serendipitous, and transactional. Save the unique examples within some
schools, the reality in most schools is that traditional expectations have been so deeply
entrenched prior to teachers and student actually entering the hallways, that the task of
changing schools is often seen as impossible. Epistemologically, if a parallel could be
made here, it is as though STK and the entailing correspondence theory of truth is the
given and the taken for granted in schools.
For the second point from above, when prospective teachers enter their course
work as education majors (or for certification), it is not without ideas and experiences
that inform what they want to do and how they want to do it, it simply is with virtually no
change whatsoever in the culture from which they came. They were reared as spectators
(and often spectate in their college classes, too) and even when some students profess to
wanting to “engage” their students in “active” learning, it still usually ends up being a
souped-up version of traditional schooling—or as Dewey puts it Experience and
Education, using “devices of art to cover up obviously brutal features.” 45 Fear of losing a
job, fear of being reprimanded, and fear of standing out as “different” are common
45
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excuses teachers give for not challenging an established school structure they understand
to be problematic. It is in this sense that I wish to force the revolutionary point that
teachers, regardless of the superstructure, have epistemological (and other )
responsibilities to their students. At the risk of being perceived as another in a long line
of people who blame teachers, I nonetheless believe that teachers are in positions of
power they may not even understand. What is actually being asserted here is that
teachers already have space and control over what goes on in their classrooms. Beyond
the power that could be actualized from teacher shortages nationwide, add the possibility
that teachers broaden their understanding of pedagogy by engaging in epistemological
discourse, and change becomes imaginable. There is, of course, no guarantee that
teachers who enter such epistemological discourse will value Dewey’s notion of
warranted assertibility over, say, the “certainty” often attached to foundationalism. Still,
by actually championing the intellectual and practical possibilities of the very teachers I
risked blaming a moment ago, I am urging a movement of teachers to claim school
spaces for themselves and their students in ways that are grounded in Deweyan
epistemology.
To envision classroom practices that specifically endorse warranted assertions
would mean that students and teachers would no longer search for or operate under the
assumption of “the truth” in Platonic, Kantian, or “No Child Left Behind” terms. Instead,
students/teachers would make assertions connected to solving their problems (both
immediate and connected to as-yet-unknown areas) that are gauged (i.e., judged) within
the bounds of human experience. This not only represents an epistemological shift, it
shifts power away from the traditional quest for certainty and places power with the
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contexts of student/teacher living—one not divorced from social realities beyond school,
and also not divorced from parent and social interaction. In short, traditional
epistemology and an entailing power structure that supports it may be largely to blame
for the general lack of inquiry found within U.S. classrooms. Students as testable objects
themselves, and whose role it is to gather discreet bits of data and information
(knowledge?), are repeatedly subjected to a classroom sphere where the only evidence of
relation is between teacher- and curriculum-imposed artifacts and superimposed goals.
As has been alluded to, even good teachers are burdened by the perversion of
correspondence seen most schools. Never mind that the tests that are claimed to be
“objective” and “neutral” are subjectively constructed—all the tests, the standards, the
mission statements, the learning objectives. It makes little difference. Because the
presentation of that reality is repeated as “the real world” or “the way it is,” its
unassailability is arguably the very feature privileged by STK in traditional epistemology.
It seems as though the “view from nowhere” is precisely the view most educators and
educational policy makers repeatedly expect. It is no wonder, then, that most public
school classrooms continue to be stultifying arenas for external indoctrination.
Dewey’s epistemology, however, is an offering. It is a possible “out.” It
represents one way students and teachers might develop relations in less contrived ways
that what currently goes on in most schools. By shifting roles of teachers and students so
that both groups are inquirers into problems they face, certitude goes out the window as
the expectation for certitude is challenged. In place of certainty (the entailing result of
STK and correspondence theories of truth) is stability and it comes into being when the
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engagement between teachers and students (and students and students, parents and
students, etc.) supports inquiry leading to warranted assertions.
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